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NONCOMPETITION COVENANTS IN COLORADO: A
STATUTORY SOLUTION?
By JAMES R. KRENDL,* CATHY S. KRENDL**
INTRODUCTION
Noncompetition covenants are agreements whereby one
party, the covenantor, agrees not to compete with another party,
the covenantee, in a particular line of business for a specified
period of time and in a specified area.' A noncompetition agree-
ment is a restraint of trade which is normally illegal both at
common law and under state and federal antitrust statutes.'
However, limited noncompetition covenants are sometimes law-
ful if they are ancillary to an otherwise legitimate agreement.
Thus, a noncompetition covenant by an employee not to compete
with his employer or by a seller of a business not to compete with
the buyer may be enforceable.' The common law rule in Colorado
is that a reasonable noncompetition agreement will be enforced
if it is necessary for the protection of the covenantee, imposes no
undue hardship on the covenantor, and does not injure the gen-
eral public.' However, the tendency in this state has been simply
*Associate, Seawell, Cohen & Sachs, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1963, Harvard Univer-
sity; J.D., 1970, Harvard Law School.
**Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; B.A., 1967, North
Texas State University; J.D., 1970, Harvard Law School.
6A A. CoRnIN, CORIN ON CONTRACT §§ 1385-95 (1962) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN];
14 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF CONTRACTS §§ 1637-44 (3d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as WILLISTON]. Restrictive covenants are especially useful in businesses
where trade secrets or customer goodwill are important. See R. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS
§ 3.02 (12 BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, 1974). See generally WILLISTON §§ 1640-41; Blake,
Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REv. 625 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
Blake]; Wetzell, Employment Contracts and Noncompetition Agreements, 1969 U. ILL.
L. FORuM 61.
See CORBIN §§ 1387-1403; WILLISTON §§ 1645A-64B.
WILLSTON § 1641. See generally Blake at 646-87.
For cases which interpret Colorado common law on covenants not to compete, see
Goldammer v. Fay, 326 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1964); Trans-American Collections, Inc. v.
Continental Account Servicing House, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Utah 1972); Jim
Sprague's Aetna Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Hruz, 172 Colo. 469, 474 P.2d 216 (1970); Zeff,
Farrington & Assocs. v. Farrington, 168 Colo. 48, 449 P.2d 813 (1969); Knoebel Mercantile
Co. v. Siders, 165 Colo. 393, 439 P.2d 355 (1968); Fuller v. Brough, 159 Colo. 147, 411 P.2d
18 (1966); Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Kelley, 146 Colo. 550, 362 P.2d 184 (1961);
Mabray v. Williams, 132 Colo. 523, 291 P.2d 677 (1955); Ditus v. Beahm, 123 Colo. 550,
232 P.2d 184 (1951); Cantrell v. Lemons, 119 Colo. 107, 200 P.2d 911 (1948); Whittenberg
v. Williams, 110 Colo. 418, 135 P.2d 228 (1943); Electrical Prod. Consol. v. Howell, 108
Colo. 370, 117 P.2d 1010 (1941); Weber v. Nonpareil Baking Co., 85 Colo. 232, 274 P. 932
(1929); Axelson v. Columbine Laundry Co., 81 Colo. 254, 254 P. 990 (1927); Gadf v.
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to enforce such agreements in accordance with their express
terms, with little attention paid to the balancing requirements of
the rule.5 This judicial tendency has caused concern, particularly
for the rights of employees who are often required to execute
potentially harsh covenants as a condition to employment.' Con-
sequently, the Colorado Legislature in 1973 amended Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 8-2-113 (1973), to void all covenants which limit
future employment except those related to the sale of a business,
the protection of trade secrets, the recovery of training expenses,
or the restraint of certain key personnel.7
Although a number of other states have attempted statutory
reform in this area, the recent Colorado statutory amendment is
of particular interest because it seeks to eliminate only a narrowly
defined class of covenants without disturbing the common law
rules applicable to most noncompetition covenants.' This article
evaluates the statute by reviewing the general background of the
law of restrictive covenants, the development of the common law
in Colorado, the nature of the statutory amendment recently en-
acted, and current problems and prospects in light of the new
statute.
I. BACKGROUND
Agreements not to compete have been known to the common
law for more than 500 years.' The first recorded use of noncompe-
Weitzman, 72 Colo. 136, 209 P. 809 (1922); Barrows v. McMurtry Mfg. Co., 54 Colo. 432,
131 P. 430 (1913); Freudenthal v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488, 102 P. 280 (1909); Colorado Urologi-
cal Assocs., P.C. v. Grossman, 529 P.2d 625 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); Taff v. Brayman, 518
P.2d 298 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); Flower Haven, Inc. v. Palmer, 502 P.2d 424 (Colo. Ct. App.
1972); Short v. Fahrney, 502 P.2d 982 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972); Gibson v. Angros, 30 Colo.
App. 95, 491 P.2d 87 (1971); Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Kappers, 488 P.2d 96
(Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Gulick v. A. Robert Strawn & Assocs., 477 P.2d 489 (Colo. Ct. App.
1970); Wagner v. A & B Personnel Sys., Ltd., 473 P.2d 179 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970); Jewel
Tea Co. v. Watkins, 26 Colo. App. 494, 145 P. 719 (1915).
5 See, e.g., Jim Sprague's Aetna Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Hruz, 172 Colo. 469, 474 P.2d
216 (1970); Zeff, Farrington & Assocs. v. Farrington, 168 Colo. 48, 449 P.2d 813 (1969);
Whittenberg v. Williams, 110 Colo. 418, 135 P.2d 228 (1943).
1 Hearings on H.B. No. 1215 Before the Colorado House Judiciary Comm., 49th Gen.
Assembly, 1st Sess., Mar. 15, 1973, Channel E, Tape Top Meter 14-46-24; Hearings on
H.B. No. 1215 Before the Colorado Senate Judiciary Comm., 49th Gen. Assembly, 1st
Sess., May 6, 1973, Channel B/C, Tape Top Meter 12-55-42.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2) (1973). For complete statutory language, see text
accompanying note 108 infra.
I See notes 110-15 infra for a list of states which have enacted legislation on covenants
not to compete.
I Dyer's Case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (C.P. 1414) is the first reported case
involving a noncompetition agreement.
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tition covenants was by master craftsmen who attempted unsuc-
cessfully to enforce agreements which prevented their apprentices
from entering into post-employment competition.' 0 Later, similar
restrictive covenants were utilized in connection with other com-
mercial agreements, such as leases," sales agreements," and fran-
chises.'
Although in some early cases liquidated damages were estab-
lished by requiring the covenantor to post a bond forfeitable upon
breach'4 (and some modern courts still award damages in unusual
circumstances),'" today the usual remedy is the entry of an appro-
priate injunction against the covenantor in accordance with the
terms of the covenant.'" Equitable rules therefore govern most
restrictive agreement cases, and the successful plaintiff must es-
tablish the necessary grounds for the issuance of an injunction."
It has been said that the common law viewed restrictive cove-
nants with disfavor and therefore refused to enforce them.' 8 Al-
though this statement may not be completely true,'9 it does cor-
rectly represent the reluctance of most courts to grant injunctive
relief which may severely restrict the economic freedom of the
covenantor and deprive the public of the benefits of competi-
tion.",
On the other hand, courts have long recognized that equity
may require the enforcement of limited restrictions on the facts
of a particular case. This is true, for instance, when an estab-
lished business or professional practice is sold and the seller cove-
10 Blake at 632. The authors have relied heavily on Professor Blake's excellent study
in preparing this background section.
* See, e.g., Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
* See generally Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 4 (1964) and Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 77 (1956) for
modem cases.
13 Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 746 (1973).
I, Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
'5 See cases cited note 81 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 91-100 infra for a discussion of the doctrine of partial
enforcement, whereby an injunction in terms less broad than those of the covenant may
be granted.
J See CoaIN §§ 1380, 1390; WILUSTON §§ 1630A, 1635-36, 1649B.
IS See Freudenthal v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488, 102 P. 280 (1909).
" Blake at 632-37.
20 There are strong public policies against any kind of restriction on competition.
Such covenants are distasteful to Anglo-American law as restraints on the freedom of
covenantors and as infringements on the public interest in economic competition. Any
kind of restrictive agreement is probably void except to the extent it is ancillary to a
legitimate agreement such as an employment contract or contract of sale. WILUSTON §
1635. See also Wetzell, supra note 1.
1975
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nants not to compete with the buyer. One of the principal assets
purchased in such a transaction is the established goodwill of the
business, which is often little more than the seller's personal rep-
utation and relationships with customers. If the seller is free to
violate the n*oncompetition agreement he can, in effect, virtually
render valueless the property rights which he has sold.'
Restrictive covenants in employment agreements may also
serve very valid purposes. For example, an employee might have
access to confidential information which does not merit trade
secret protection but which, nonetheless, could be used effec-
tively and unfairly to compete with the employer.2 Additionally,
the employer may have made a substantial investment in the
employee's training, which he should not be permitted to use in
competition with the employer. 23 The customer relationships and
reputation which an employee develops are business assets, and
it is at least arguably unfair for the employee to divert such assets
to his own use by entering into a competitive business.24 Finally,
there is perhaps an underlying concept that if the employee delib-
erately and disloyally schemes to set up his own business while
being paid by the employer, equity ought to permit some reasona-
ble restraint on his activities.
In wrestling with these considerations, the early English
courts differentiated between general and particular restraints,
holding that a restraint extending throughout the entire kingdom
was always void but that a more limited restraint might be en-
forceable under the proper circumstances.25 This rule was later
" See Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
A common law action for unfair competition may exist regardless of the existence
of a contractual restriction. Therefore, an ex-employee is always subject to legal action if
he unfairly entices other employees to resign, interferes with the former employer's con-
tractual relations, or utilizes his trade secrets. However, as a practical matter it is often
difficult to prove an unfair competition case, and of course the procedure is less certain
of success than a simple action on a restrictive covenant. See, e.g., Suburban Gas of Grand
Junction, Inc. v. Bockelman, 157 Colo. 78, 401 P.2d 268 (1965). With respect to use of
customer lists, see generally Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 7 (1969).
11 Both the Louisiana and Colorado statutes applicable to restrictive agreements
permit covenants in connection with the employment of individuals who have received
the benefit of training or education from their employers. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-
113(2)(c) (1973); LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (1964).
24 Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 237 P.2d 823 (1951) (the court, in
upholding an injunction pursuant to a restrictive covenant, pointed out that since the
employee had been paid to develop clientele for the employer, he should not be permitted
to divert customer goodwill for his personal benefit); CoRmN § 1394.
" See, e.g., Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711), which cited earlier
cases for support.
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refined to apply to "reasonable" restraints, permitting covenants
which extended far enough to protect the covenantee but not so
far as to injure the general public. This rule was stated as follows
in Homer v. Graves:"5
[Wie do not see how a better test can be applied to the question
whether reasonable or not, than by considering whether the restraint
is such only as to afford a fair protection to the interests of the party
in favour of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with
the interests of the public. Whatever restraint is larger than the
necessary protection of the party, can be of no benefit to either, it
can only be oppressive; and if oppressive, it is, in the eye of the law,
unreasonable. Whatever is injurious to the interests of the public is
void, on the grounds of public policy."
Most American cases and later English cases added one more
factor to the rule of Horner v. Graves, the necessity of weighing
the hardship on the covenantor against the benefit to the coven-
antee.2 8 Accordingly, the majority rule in both the United States
and the United Kingdom today is reasonableness, which is deter-
mined by balancing, on the facts of each case, the following inter-
ests: (1) the legitimate needs of the covenantee for protection; (2)
the interest of society in preventing monopolies or other excessive
restrictions on competition; and (3) the burden placed on the
covenantor. 9
Because the modern rule is difficult to apply evenhandedly
on the facts of individual cases, a vast amount of litigation has
arisen in this area2 The courts have been particularly troubled
by the difficulty of applying the rule with respect to employment
contracts or other situations in which the parties have greatly
disproportionate bargaining positions. At least in the employ-
ment contract context it often appears that the covenantor has
little choice but to sign the restrictive agreement and often re-
ceives no clearly identifiable consideration in exchange. ', An ad-
ditional problem arises when the covenantor is uncertain whether
26 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P. 1831).
Id. at 287.
See, e.g., Mandeville v. Harman, 42 N.J. Eq. 184, 7 A. 37 (1886); Diamond Match
Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419 (1887); Herreshoff v. Boutinea, 17 R.I. 3, 19 A.
712 (1890); Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, [1916] A.C. 688; Mason v. Provident Clo-
thing & Supply Co., [1913] A.C. 724.
See RESTATEMENT OF CoNrC s § 515 (1932).
See, e.g., annotations cited in notes 12, 13 supra.
" For example, covenants have sometimes been enforced against employees where
they were entered into after the employment contract so that employment was clearly not
consideration for the covenant. See Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 825 (1973).
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the covenant is reasonable and lacks the courage or the resources
to engage in a legal battle over its validity. Consequently, even
those covenants which are never the subject of legal dispute may
have a severe dampening effect, both on the individual covenan-
tor's freedom and on the public interest in competition.32
As a result of these problems, a number of states have taken
legislative action to declare certain kinds of covenants void or
illegal.33 The statutes in this area usually declare restrictive cove-
nants void with certain specified exceptions. Those within the
exempted classifications, such as covenants in consideration of
the purchase of a business, remain subject to the judicial rules of
reasonableness.
This type of drastic legislative action has not been widely
adopted, and some states, having passed such statutes, have sub-
sequently modified them to permit restrictive covenants in at
least some types of employment agreements. 4 This reluctance to
prohibit all restrictive covenants ancillary to employment con-
tracts presumably results from a recognition that at least some
of these covenants are reasonable and desirable.
The recent amendment to the Colorado statutes" represents
a different legislative approach to the problem of noncompetition
agreements. The Colorado law voids only those covenants which
restrict future employment, thereby permitting restrictions on a
covenantor's right to set up his own competitive business. The
statute further expressly exempts covenants, including those af-
fecting subsequent employment, where the covenant is related to
the purchase and sale of a business, the protection of trade se-
crets, the recovery of training expenses by an employer, or the
employment of certain key personnel. Accordingly, the Colorado
32 These considerations have led some courts and commentators to conclude that
noncompetition agreements ancillary to employment contracts should be governed by
different rules than covenants ancillary to, for example, purchase agreements. See Nor-
denfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C. 535; WELISTON at §
1643. However, it would seem more precise to formulate the distinction in terms of the
relative bargaining powers of the parties and the presence of adequate consideration,
which may be problems more apt to occur in an employment context but which will not
be characteristic of every employment contract and which may occur occasionally in other
types of agreements.
13 See text accompanying notes 110-15 infra for a discussion of various statutes.
14 Id. Alabama. and Louisiana have both amended statutes to permit at least partial
enforcement of employment contract covenants. ALA. CODE tit. 9, §§ 22-24 (1959). LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (1964).
'5 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2) (1973), quoted in text accompanying note 108.
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statute is of interest as a legislative effort to distinguish between
a narrowly defined class of covenants which are declared void and
all others which continue to be governed by the common law test
of reasonableness. In order to evaluate the Colorado statute it is
necessary to examine the common law framework against which
it was enacted.
II. COLORADO COMMON LAW
A. Establishing the Rule
1. The Early Cases
The first case considered by a Colorado appellate court in-
volving a noncompetition agreement was Freudenthal v. Espey.36
In that case, the plaintiff, a well-established physician in Trini-
dad, hired a young doctor under an employment agreement which
provided that upon termination of his employment the employee
would not engage in "'the practice of medicine, surgery or obste-
trics, or the branches of either in the City of Trinidad . . . for the
full period of five years.' -3 The younger doctor subsequently
terminated his employment and soon thereafter started a com-
petitive medical practice in the Trinidad area.
In a thorough review of the applicable precedents and policy
considerations, the Colorado Supreme Court stated that restric-
tive covenants had been viewed with disfavor at common law, but
that the modern trend was to uphold such covenants provided
that they were "reasonable." The court approvingly quoted
Horner v. Graves38 in what came to be viewed as the rule of
Freudenthal: a covenant will be enforced if it is necessary to
protect the covenantee and does not interfere with the interests
of the public." Considering the public interest in encouraging a
successful medical practitioner to train and assist a younger doc-
tor, the court determined that the covenant was reasonable and
should be enforced. The opinion concluded with an unusually
strong statement that equity compelled the enforcement of such
a contract:
Here there is an express covenant, with full performance by one,
and certain mischief arising from its breach by the other. The mis-
chief cannot be repaired, nor can it well be estimated. The damages
are continuing and accruing from day to day. The reasonable and
45 Colo. 488, 102 P. 280 (1909).
11 Id. at 490, 102 P. at 281.
131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P. 1831).
3, Freudenthal v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488, 502, 102 P. 281, 285 (1909).
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fair protection to which the plaintiff is entitled can only be obtained
by the parties conforming expressly and exactly to the terms of the
contract. The defendant is in the wrong. He is deliberately doing
what he plainly agreed not to do. The equities are with the plaintiff
and the decree is accordingly affirmed.40
Four years later, in Barrows v. McMurtry Manufacturing
Co.4' the Colorado Supreme Court expanded the Freudenthal rule
to uphold a covenant of noncompetition ancillary to a contract of
sale. Stanley M. Barrows, his brother, and his sister sold substan-
tially all of the assets of their plate glass company, including
goodwill, to plaintiffs. The sellers agreed not to participate "'in
any company or corporation which in any way carries on in the
state of Colorado any class of business similar to that heretofore
carried on by . . .'" the purchasers.2 Within 2 weeks after the
sale, Mr. Barrows caused the incorporation of a new plate glass
company in Colorado. In affirming the issuance of an injunction
against Barrows, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that restric-
tive covenants given in consideration of the purchase of the good-
will of a business were almost universally enforced and cited the
Colorado rule established in Freudenthal . 3 The court then ana-
lyzed in detail the public interest, evidencing particular concern
with Barrows' contention that enforcement of the covenant would
tend toward monopoly. Prior to the sale Barrows had been selling
plate glass at a lower price than his competitors, and plate glass
prices had risen in Colorado subsequent to the purchase of his
business. While acknowledging these facts, the court determined
that Barrows had operated at a loss, that this was detrimental to
competition, and that the public interest would be better served
by the higher prices and greater economic stability which existed
subsequent to his sale."
Id. at 506-07, 102 P. at 286.
41 54 Colo. 432, 131 P. 430 (1913).
42 Id. at 434, 131 P. at 431.
Id. at 441, 131 P. at 433-34.
While it is doubtless true that competition is the life of trade, it is also
equally true that competition of a certain sort almost inevitably leads to
disaster, not alone to those immediately concerned, but to the public as well.
It is safe to say that the general welfare is best served by healthy competi-
tion, which allows business enterprise, when conducted with energy and
skill, to gather fair returns upon the ability, industry and capital employed.
While ruinous competition, which demoralizes an industry and business, and
prevents reasonable returns on the investment, may sometimes bring tempo-
rary gain to the public, must (sic), in the very nature of things, finally result
in general and permanent loss and disaster.
Id. at 448, 131 P. at 436.
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The Barrows court also intensified the crusade for contrac-
tual sanctity declared in Freudenthal. It declared that public
policy demanded that noncompetition covenants be upheld
whenever possible:
It may not be amiss to here suggest that there can be no sound
and wholesome public policy, which operates in the slightest degree
to lend approval to the open disregard and violation of personal
contracts entered into in good faith, upon good consideration. It is
quite as important, as a matter of public interest and welfare, that
individuals are not allowed, with impunity, to transgress their sol-
emn undertakings, advisedly entered upon, as it is that the public
have protection in other respects. Where one is so lost to a sense of
moral obligation as to accept the full consideration for his stock in
trade and good-will, upon express condition that he refrain from
again entering that business for a limited time, within a certain
territory, and then immediately, having pocketed the fruits of the
agreement, deliberately and wilfully ignores the controlling condi-
tion thereof, courts should certainly not hunt for legal excuse to
uphold him in such moral delinquency. On the contrary, in the
interest of the general public, and to discourage bad faith conduct
of that sort, wherever, without violation of legal principles and pub-
lic policy, it may be done, contracts like the one under discussion
should be rigidly upheld and enforced. 5
The rule of Freudenthal and Barrows was simple: a noncom-
petition agreement would be enforced if it was reasonable, was
necessary to protect a valid interest of the covenantee, and im-
posed no undue hardship on society at large.46 This is a stern rule,
with no consideration for the degree of hardship imposed on cov-
enantors. When only the interests of the covenantee and the pub-
lic are weighed, and the public is deemed adequately served by
such covenants, most covenants will be enforced. When one adds
to this the strong language of both Freudenthal and Barrows for
enforcing covenants whenever possible, it is clear that Colorado
law has favored the covenantee.
2. Defining "Reasonable"
The key word in the Colorado rule is "reasonable." Having
made this the pivotal point in Barrows, the Colorado courts then
had to decide how to determine reasonableness. It appears that
the courts tend toward a two-step approach to reasonableness.
Id. at 447, 131 P. at 436.
Although Freudenthal mentions that the covenant should not be oppressive to the
covenantor and discusses whether there is adequacy of consideration and mutuality, rea-




First, they decide whether any covenant is reasonably necessary
to protect the legitimate needs of the covenantee. Second, they
determine whether the particular covenant before them is reason-
able with respect to time, space, and type of activity.47
In determining the reasonableness of a noncompetition cove-
nant, the Colorado courts consider whether: (i) the covenantor
had frequent contacts with the customers or clients of the coven-
antee;48 (ii) the covenantee's business relied to a substantial de-
gree on trade secrets to which the covenantor had access;49 (iii)
the covenantee provided training to the covenantor; 0 (iv) the
covenantee's business was highly technical or complex;5 (v) the
covenantee's business was highly competitive;52 (vi) the covenan-
tor, while employed by the covenantee, was a key employee, for
example, in a managerial position; 53 (vii) the covenantor provided
unique services while employed by the covenantee.54 The courts
then turn their attention to whether or not the particular cove-
nant being considered is reasonable; that is, does it exceed with
respect to time, space, and type of activity what is reasonably
required to give the covenantee the protection to which he is
entitled.
No covenant has ever been found unreasonable in Colorado
on the basis of a time restriction although covenants reviewed
have ranged from a term of 6 months to perpetuity.5 A number
" For an articulation of this reasoning, see Gulick v. A. Robert Strawn & Assocs., 477
P.2d 489, 492 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970).
11 Knoebel Mercantile Co. v. Siders, 165 Colo. 393, 439 P.2d 355 (1968); Electrical
Prod. Consol. v. Howell, 108 Colo. 370, 117 P.2d 1010 (1941); Gulick v. A. Robert Strawn
& Assocs., 477 P.2d 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970).
" Zeff, Farrington & Assocs. v. Farrington, 168 Colo. 48, 449 P.2d 813 (1969); Knoebel
Mercantile Co. v. Siders, 165 Colo. 393, 439 P.2d 355 (1968); Addressograph-Multigraph
Corp. v. Kelley, 146 Colo. 550, 362 P.2d 184 (1961); Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v.
Kappers, 488 P.2d 96 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
50 Jim Sprague's Aetna Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Hruz, 172 Colo. 469, 474 P.2d 216 (1970);
Whittenberg v. Williams, 110 Colo. 418, 135 P.2d 228 (1943).
1' Electrical Prod. Consol. v. Howell, 108 Colo. 370, 117 P.2d 1010 (1941); Barrows v.
McMurtry Mfg. Co., 54 Colo. 432, 131 P. 430 (1913); Freudenthal v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488,
102 P. 280 (1909).
52 Goldammer v. Fay, 326 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1964); Electrical Prod. Consol. v. How-
ell, 108 Colo. 370, 117 P.2d 1010 (1941).
11 Trans-American Collections, Inc. v. Continental Account Servicing House, Inc.,
342 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Utah 1972); Knoebel Mercantile Co. v. Siders, 165 Colo. 393, 439
P.2d 355 (1968).
14 Knoebel Mercantile Co. v. Siders, 165 Colo. 393, 439 P.2d 355 (1968).
" See, e.g., Axelson v. Columbine Laundry Co., 81 Colo. 254, 254 P. 990 (1927)
(employment contract-6 mos.); Jewel Tea Co. v. Watkins, 26 Colo. App. 494, 145 P. 719
(1915) (employment contract-1 yr.); Trans-American Collections, Inc. v. Continental
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of covenants have, however, been found unreasonable because of
the scope of the geographic area involved.5" The courts have pro-
vided little explanation of the basis for such determinations. On
the other hand, in one case, a Utah federal district court applying
Colorado law enforced a nationwide territorial restriction. The
court found that (1) the plaintiff-employer had provided national
exposure to the defendant-employee by reproducing his sales
presentations at sales clinics throughout the country and inviting
him to speak at a national sales convention; (2) the employee,
who had been in a managerial position, had been trained by the
agency and had had numerous customer contacts which would
have enabled him to set up a competing business easily; (3) the
competitive activity to be restrained was only the relatively nar-
row activity of selling flat-rate account collection letters; and (4)
the former employee could apply his sales expertise in other non-
competitive activities without great hardship. 5
The courts have never modified the terms of a covenant with
respect to the type of activity restrained, although in one case the
court narrowly construed its terms. Where a salesman agreed not
Account Servicing House, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Utah 1972) (employment con-
tract-2 yrs.); Zeff, Farrington & Assocs. v. Farrington, 168 Colo. 48, 449 P.2d 813 (1969)
(employment contract-3 yrs.); Cantrell v. Lemons, 119 Colo. 107, 200 P.2d 911 (1948)
(sale of a business-5 yrs.); Flower Haven, Inc. v. Palmer, 502 P.2d 424 (Colo. Ct. App.
1972) (sale of a business-5 yrs.); Ditus v. Beahm, 123 Colo. 550, 232 P.2d 184 (1951) (sale
of a business-50 yrs.); Weber v. Nonpareil Baking Co., 85 Colo. 232, 274 P. 932 (1929)
(sale of a business-in perpetuity). But see Taff v. Brayman, 518 P.2d 298 (Colo. Ct. App.
1974) in which the trial court determined that a 2-year restriction was excessive but the
appellate court reversed apparently because the defendant failed to show that the period
was excessive. See generally Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 15 (1955) for a discussion of reasonable
time as defined by other jurisdictions.
" See, e.g., Gulick v. A. Robert Strawn & Assocs., 477 P.2d 489, 490 (Colo. Ct. App.
1970) (territorial restriction reduced from "within a radius of thirty-five (35) miles of
SNELLING'S office, or within a radius of thirty-five (35) miles of any city in which a
'Snelling and Snelling' office is located" to within 10 miles from the boundaries of Den-
ver); Wagner v. A & B Personnel Sys., Ltd., 473 P.2d 179, 180 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970)
(territorial restriction reduced from "within fifty (50) miles of any city in which Agency
is doing business" to within 50 miles of Denver); Whittenberg v. Williams, 110 Colo. 418,
419, 135 P.2d 228 (1943) (worldwide territorial restriction reduced to "that portion of
Colorado south of the northern boundary of the City and County of Denver and east of
the Rocky Mountains"). Covenants were enforced in Axelson v. Columbine Laundry Co.,
81 Colo. 254, 254 P. 990 (1927) (territorial restriction of City and County of Denver); Jewel
Tea Co. v. Watkins, 26 Colo. App. 494, 145 P. 719 (1915) (territory that employee worked);
Ditus v. Beahm, 123 Colo. 500, 232 P.2d 184 (1951) (50-mile radius); Barrows v. McMurtry
Mfg. Co., 54 Colo. 432, 131 P. 430 (1913) (State of Colorado); Trans-American Collections,
Inc. v. Continental Account Servicing House, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Utah 1972)
(entire United States). See generally Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 15 (1955).
1, Trans-American Collections, Inc. v. Continental Account Servicing House, Inc.,
342 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Utah 1972).
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to compete in soliciting, taking, and delivering orders for "teas,
coffees, baking powder, extracts, spices, cocoa or other
merchandise,""' the court stated that if "other merchandise" in-
cluded all other merchandise, the activity restraint might be too
broad. Therefore, the court read "other merchandise" to mean
other merchandise of the same or similar type and upheld the
covenant on the grounds that a covenant, when ambiguous,
should be interpreted to make it reasonable. 9 The result has
been, then, a determination of reasonableness on the facts of each
case.
B. Balancing Conflicting Interests
The general rule has sometimes been stated that a "reasona-
ble" covenant is one that gives the protected party its due with-
out unfair harm to others, including society as a whole.'" This is
not, however, the formulation which has been applied in Colo-
rado. The very first Colorado case stated that, aside from the
issue of reasonableness, the court must analyze the interests of
the covenantee and the concerns of the general public."' Although
two Colorado cases have discussed the public interest in specific
noncompetition covenants 2 and many cases have declared that
the public has an interest in seeing contracts enforced as writ-
ten,63 no covenant in this state has ever been rejected as offending
public policy. It therefore appears that the concerns of society at
large have had little real effect on noncompetition decisions in
Colorado.
The early statements of Colorado law were later brought into
closer accord with the generally accepted modern rule. In
Jewel Tea Co. v. Watkins, 26 Colo. App. 494, 495, 145 P. 719, 720 (1915).
" In a few rare cases the covenant itself has restricted activity to a narrow area. See
Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Kappers, 488 P.2d 96 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) in which
the employee was merely prohibited from selling certain specified insurance policies to
customers with whom he dealt while in the employ of the covenantee.
" RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 515 (1932); Blake at 648-49.
" Freudenthal v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488, 102 P. 280 (1909).
82 Barrows v. McMurtry Mfg. Co., 54 Colo. 432, 131 P. 430 (1913) (the public would
be served by the raising of plate glass prices); Freudenthal v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488, 102 P.
280 (1909) (it would be useful to the public to have a young doctor excluded from practice
in Trinidad). See text accompanying notes 36-46 supra.
83 Jim Sprague's Aetna Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Hruz, 172 Colo. 469, 474 P.2d 216 (1970);
Zeff, Farrington & Assocs. v. Farrington, 168 Colo. 48, 449 P.2d 813 (1969); Mabray v.
Williams, 132 Colo. 523, 291 P.2d 677 (1955); Whittenberg v. Williams, 110 Colo. 418, 135
P.2d 228 (1941); Barrows v. McMurtry Mfg. Co., 54 Colo. 432, 131 P. 430 (1913); Freuden-
thai v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488, 102 P. 280 (1909); Gibson v. Angros, 30 Colo. App. 95, 491
P.2d 87 (1971); Wagner v. A & B Personnel Sys., Ltd., 473 P.2d 179 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970).
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Whittenberg v. Williams4 the court recognized that consideration
should also be given to hardship of the covenantor:
Such restrictions to be valid must be reasonable, not impose undue
hardship, be no wider than necessary to afford the required protec-
tion, and that each case must stand upon its own facts."'
The reference to hardship in the Whittenberg opinion is dictum;
the court proceeded to grant partial enforcement of the covenant
without reference to the effect this might have on the covenantor.
The Whittenberg case quoted the Barrows language to the effect
that there was a duty to enforce contracts against those who
signed them as if this were the principal basis of the decision."
However, the recognition of the interests of covenantors has re-
mained and although it has sometimes been followed, it seems
more honored in the breach than in the observance."
In at least two cases, Goldammer v. Fay6" and Knoebel Mer-
cantile Co. v. Siders,6" courts have weighed the hardship on the
covenantor against the benefit to the covenantee and then de-
cided against enforcement. These cases deserve careful attention
as illustrations of how the Colorado rule works when thoroughly
applied. In Goldammer the various plaintiffs had sold a franchise
to the Fays to operate a Dairy Queen business in Colorado
Springs. The franchise agreement contained a 2-year restrictive
covenant whereby Mr. and Mrs. Fay agreed not to "directly or
indirectly engage in any competitive business" 0 in the Colorado
Springs area. The franchise operation was unsuccessful, the Fays
110 Colo. 418, 135 P.2d 228 (1943).
o Id. at 420, 135 P.2d at 229. The court said that this statement, which was put forth
by the defendant, "is unquestionably the law." Id. This rule was first discussed in Electri-
cal Prod. Consol. v. Howell, 108 Colo. 370, 117 P.2d 1010 (1941). However, subsequent
cases refer to it as "the rule of Whittenberg."
110 Colo. at 422, 135 P.2d at 229.
*' See Goldammer v. Fay, 326 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1964) (covenant not enforced be-
cause of undue harm to covenantor); Knoebel Mercantile Co. v. Siders, 165 Colo. 393, 439
P.2d 355 (1968) (covenant not enforced because of undue harm to salesman who would
have to leave region or forego life-time work); cf. Trans-American Collections, Inc. v.
Continental Account Servicing House, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Utah 1972) (covenant
enforced because, among other considerations, no undue harm to salesman would result);
Electrical Prod. Consol. v. Howell, 108 Colo. 370, 117 P.2d 1010 (1941) (summary judg-
ment in favor of defendant reversed because undue hardship is a question of fact).
Contrast these cases with the puzzling dictum in Flower Haven, Inc. v. Palmer, 502 P.2d
424 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972): "Under these circumstances, the fact that hardship will result
from enforcement of the covenant is not a defense to a willful and deliberate violation of
a reasonable covenant." Id. at 426.
326 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1964).
165 Colo. 393, 439 P.2d 355 (1968).
70 326 F.2d at 268.
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terminated the franchise, and they converted the facilities, which
they owned, to an establishment known as "Fays Drive-In." The
business was operated primarily as a coffee shop, but ice cream
was sold along with other products.
The trial court refused to issue an injunction, and the Tenth
Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that an injunction is to be granted
only when necessity is clearly established.7 The court found that
the Fays terminated the franchise because it was not profitable;
that they had attempted in good faith to differentiate their new
operation from Dairy Queen; that they had a substantial invest-
ment in the new business; that the competition which they pre-
sented to Dairy Queen was no different in kind from that of many
other establishments in Colorado Springs; and that consequently,
to grant an injunction would be an undue hardship on the Fays
with no comparable benefit to the Goldammers.
Four years later in Knoebel the Colorado Supreme Court
used similar reasoning. Siders had executed a restrictive cove-
nant with the Knoebel Mercantile Co., agreeing not to compete
for a period of 2 years
in the institutional food, paper and supply business, bakery supply
business, and janitorial supply business, or any part thereof in all
or any part of the State of Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, New
Mexico, Nebraska, Kansas, So. Dakota, and any other State in
which Employer transacts its business at any time up to the date of
such employment termination."2
The court emphasized that it was not until Siders reported for
work at Knoebel that he realized his job was conditional upon
signing the noncompetition agreement. After working for Knoebel
in the Colorado Springs area for over 2 years, Siders terminated
his employment and went to work for another company which
was at least partially competitive with Knoebel. The undisputed
evidence showed that in his new job Siders solicited some Knoe-
bel customers but that there was nothing unique either about the
services he rendered while working for Knoebel or the customer
and merchandise information he acquired at Knoebel. The trial
court determined, and the supreme court agreed, that the con-
tractual restriction on Siders was unreasonable under all the per-
tinent circumstances and cited language from Goldammer that
an injunction would not benefit the plaintiff and would be a
Id. at 270.
2 165 Colo. at 395, 439 P.2d at 356.
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serious detriment to the defendant. 73
The Knoebel decision represents a sound statement of the
general rules applicable to restrictive covenants. It does not, how-
ever, seem perfectly compatible with such cases as
Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Kelley7 and Whittenberg v.
Williams 7 which had preceded it. The Knoebel court, for exam-
ple, ignored earlier statements that covenants should be enforced
wherever possible simply as a matter of public policy and moral-
ity.7 The application of the rules in Knoebel may therefore be
subject to criticism both as being too lenient to the employee and
as being less than totally consistent with prior decisions under
Colorado law. Both Knoebel and Goldammer demonstrate, how-
ever, an attempt to balance the hardship to the covenantor
against the legitimate needs of the covenantee in determining
whether or not an injunction should issue. It must be emphasized
that Knoebel and Goldammer are unique both in the results
reached and in the careful balancing analyses of the competing
interests of the covenantor and covenantee. While they cannot be
relied on as the final word, they do illustrate the potential for
fairness which exists in the Colorado common law rule.
C. Enforcement of Covenants
Knoebel and Goldammer notwithstanding, the definite tend-
ency in Colorado has been to enforce a noncompetition covenant
by granting an appropriate injunction. Colorado courts have
ruled that a covenant should be construed in the manner most
likely to make it enforceable,7 that assignees may enforce cove-
nants not to compete, 78 that the burden of proof in establishing
unreasonableness rests on the covenantor,79 and that the exist-
ence of a noncompetition covenant may be shown through parol
evidence. 0 Two particular problems in the area of enforcement
11 Id. at 398, 439 P.2d at 359.
7, 146 Colo. 550, 362 P.2d 184 (1961) (enforcing covenant ancillary to employment
contract prohibiting competition in exterminating business for 5 years).
11 110 Colo. 418, 362 P.2d 184 (1961) (enforcing covenant ancillary to salesman's
employment contract prohibiting competition within 100 miles of Denver for 1 year).
"' See, e.g., discussion of Barrows in text accompanying notes 40-45 supra.
" See Jewel Tea Co. v. Watkins, 26 Colo. App. 494, 145 P. 719 (1915).
"h See Cantrell v. Lemons, 119 Colo. 107, 200 P.2d 911 (1948); Flower Haven, Inc. v.
Palmer, 502 P.2d 424 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).
"' Taft v. Brayman, 518 P.2d 298 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); see Jim Sprague's Aetna
Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Hruz, 172 Colo. 469, 474 P.2d 216 (1970).
" See Cantrell v. Lemons, 119 Colo. 107, 200 P.2d 911 (1948).
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warrant special attention: the grounds for which a court may
issue an injunction and the circumstances in which a court may
partially enforce a covenant.8'
1. Basis for Injunctive Relief
One of the most marked developments in Colorado law has
been the tendency to grant an injunction almost automatically
once a valid covenant is established. This approach is set forth
most explicitly in Ditus v. Beahm, 2 an action brought by part-
ners to enforce a noncompetition agreement entered into by their
ex-partner in connection with his sale of partnership assets to
them. The court properly cited the general rule:
Where an established business has been sold with its goodwill and
there is a valid covenant not to compete, a breach is regarded as the
controlling factor and injunctive relief follows almost as a matter of
course. In such cases, the damage is presumed to be irreparable and
the remedy at law is considered inadequate. It is not necessary that
the buyer first prove special pecuniary damages or show an actual
loss of customers who might in any event have discontinued their
patronage. Injunctive relief may be given, even though only nominal
damages are shown, or although no actual damage is shown.Y
Thus, if a valid covenant is established, an injunction follows as
a matter of course, without further inquiry into irreparable harm
or other equitable considerations. While this may be entirely rea-
sonable where the covenant has been bargained for and consider-
ation has been given, as in a covenant ancillary to a contract of
sale, it is not defensible in the typical employment contract situa-
tion where the employee does not have full understanding or ade-
quate bargaining power and where no consideration is given for
the covenant. Nonetheless, the same rule has often been followed
in employment contract cases.84
S, Damages for breach of a noncompetition covenant have been sought in 12 of the
26 Colorado cases and have been awarded only in Wagner v. A & B Personnel Sys., Ltd.,
473 P.2d 179 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970), Colorado Urological Assocs., P.C. v. Grossman, 529
P.2d 625 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974), and in Trans-American Collections, Inc. v. Continental
Account Servicing House, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Utah 1972).
12 123 Colo. 550, 232 P.2d 184 (1951).
Id. at 551-52, 232 P.2d at 185, quoting 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 84 at 566-67 (1945).
The court does not refer to Freudenthal v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488, 102 P. 280 (1909), in which
it was determined that an injunction does not automatically follow a finding that the
covenant at issue is reasonable, but Freudenthal is arguably distinguishable because it
involved a covenant ancillary to an employment agreement.
Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Kelley, 146 Colo. 550, 362 P.2d 184 (1961);
Mabray v. Williams, 132 Colo. 523, 291 P.2d 677 (1955); Whittenberg v. Williams, 110
Colo. 418, 135 P.2d 228 (1943). These courts, however, did not cite Ditus as authority for
their action. Rather, they apparently relied on the language of Barrows v. McMurtry Mfg.
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This approach was modified by the Tenth Circuit in
Goldammer v. Fay, 5 in which the court refused to grant an in-
junction absent a showing of irreparable harm, and distinguished
the Colorado cases on the ground that the equitable considera-
tions were different. The Colorado state courts, though, have ig-
nored Goldammer, returning in Flower Haven, Inc. v. Palmer6 to
the Ditus rule."
The Ditus rule, however, may be rationalized. In determin-
ing whether a covenant not to compete is reasonably necessary to
protect the covenantee, the court takes into account the same
factual considerations necessary to conclude that the covenantee
has an inadequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable harm
if the injunction does not issue.8 Similarly, when the court bal-
ances the needs of the covenantee and the public against those
of the covenantor, it is merely balancing the equities. 9 Hence, it
may be argued that in finding that a covenant is reasonable or
valid, a court simultaneously determines that an equitable rem-
edy is appropriate. A separate consideration of the validity of the
covenant and the availability of an equitable remedy is then un-
necessary since both often involve the same considerations. How-
ever, some Colorado decisions appear to take a short cut by sim-
ply assuming that if the restrictive agreement was validly entered
into, it is valid, hence reasonable, and hence enforceable. 0
2. Partial Enforcement
The Colorado courts have on occasion reduced the geo-
graphic area of a noncompetition covenant because the larger
area was unnecessary to protect the legitimate needs of the coven-
Co., 54 Colo. 432, 448-94, 131 P. 430, 436 (1913). See text accompanying note 45 supra.
In fairness, there were defensible grounds for granting an injunction on the facts of
each of the cases which used the Ditus approach. Thus, in Addressograph the defendants
admitted doing business with persons they had dealt with while employed by plaintiff; in
Mabray the appellate court was merely affirming a trial court injunction and observed
that the record was insufficient to require a reversal of that injunction.
- 326 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1964) (an action by a franchisor to enforce a covenant
against a franchisee).
502 P.2d 424, 426 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).
87 See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra.
See Ditus v. Beahm, 123 Colo. 550, 232 P.2d 184 (1951); Freudenthal v. Espey, 45
Colo. 488, 102 P. 208 (1909). See also cases cited in note 84 supra.
11 For a general discussion of equitable considerations relevant to the issuance of an
injunction, see D. DoBss, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.4, .5 (1973).
O See, e.g., Jim Sprague's Aetna Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Hruz, 172 Colo. 469, 474 P.2d
216 (1970); Whittenberg v. Williams, 110 Colo. 418, 135 P.2d 288 (1943).
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antee.1' The court in Barrows, for example, observed that even
though a contract is unreasonable as to its terms, the contract
should be enforced "wherever it is possible to so divide it as to
declare it binding over such territory as is necessary for the pro-
tection of the purchaser."92 Commonly known as the "blue pencil
doctrine," this approach can be used only if the unreasonable
restrictions are severable from the reasonable restrictions. Corbin
describes the doctrine as follows:
[I]f the promise is so worded that the excessive restraint can be
eliminated by crossing out a few of the words with a blue pencil
while at the same time the remaining words constitute a complete
and valid contract, the contract as blue penciled will be enforced.
3
In subsequent cases the "blue pencil" language was dropped
by the Colorado courts and the doctrine of partial enforcement,
which would enforce contracts to the extent that they were rea-
sonable regardless of the terms, was adopted. 4 Thus, in
Whittenberg and several subsequent cases" the court in effect
11 Whittenberg v. Williams, 110 Colo. 418, 135 P.2d 228 (1943) (limited contract
specifying no territorial limitation to that portion of Colorado south of the northern bound-
ary of the City & County of Denver and east of the Rocky Mountains); Gulick v. A. Robert
Strawn & Assocs., 477 P.2d 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970) (limited contract which precluded
competition within 35 miles of any city in which Snelling & Snelling office is located to
within 10 miles from the boundary of Denver); Wagner v. A & B Personnel Sys., Ltd.,
473 P.2d 179, 180 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970) (limited contract prohibiting competition within
"50 miles of any city in which agency was doing business" to within 50 miles of agency's
location in downtown Denver).
92 Barrows v. McMurtry Mfg. Co., 54 Colo. 432, 438, 131 P. 430, 432 (1913), quoting
A. EDDY, THE LAW OF COMBINATIONS § 681 (1901).
' CoRBIN § 1390 at 67.
" This view has been advocated by leading commentators, id.; WIuSTON at §§
1647A-47B; Wetzell, supra note 1, at 66; Comment, Contracts - Partial Enforcement of
Restrictive Covenants, 50 N.C.L. Rxv. 689 (1972); it has also been adopted by a growing
minority of states. See McQuown v. Lakeland Window Cleaning Co., 136 So. 2d 370 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Ehlers v. Iowa Warehouse Co., 188 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1971); Hopkins
v. Crantz, 334 Mich. 300, 54 N.W.2d 671 (1952); Conforming Matrix Corp. v. Faber, 108
Ohio App. 8, 146 N.E.2d 447 (1957); Jacobson & Co. v. International Environment Corp.,
427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612 (1967).
,1 See cases cited note 91, supra. Gulick v. A. Robert Strawn & Assocs., 477 P.2d 489
(Colo. Ct. App. 1970) is the only Colorado case to cite authority for its partial enforcement.
Gulick refers to Wood v. May, 73 Wash. 2d 307, 438 P.2d 587 (1968) and Kelite Prod.,
Inc. v. Brandt, 206 Ore. 636, 294 P.2d 320 (1956). In Wood, the court quoted heavily from
Williston and Corbin as follows:
Professor Corbin, in approving the latter test, says:
An agreement restricting competition may be perfectly reasonable
as to a part of the territory included within the restriction but
unreasonable as to the rest. Will the courts enforce such an agree-
ment in part while holding the remainder invalid? It renders no
service to say that the answer depends upon whether or not the
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reformed the contract to cover a lesser area than that provided
for in the restrictive covenant.
The argument often presented against partial enforcement is
that it encourages employers in particular to write overly broad
covenants secure in the knowledge that the courts will enforce
them to the maximum degree considered justifiable. This has a
dampening effect on covenantors, especially those who cannot
afford a legal fight, and it places the courts in the position of
having to rewrite contracts for the parties.9" On the other hand,
it is argued that so long as a valid covenant does exist between
the parties, the court should grant relief based on what the court
contract is "divisible." "Divisibility" is a term that has no general
and invariable definition; instead the term varies so much with the
subject-matter involved and the purposes in view that its use ei-
ther as an aid to decision or in the statement of results tends to
befog the real issue.
With respect to partial illegality, the real issue is whether
partial enforcement is possible without injury to the public and
without injustice to the parties themselves. It is believed that such
enforcement is quite possible in the great majority of cases. If a
seller whose business and good will do not extend beyond the city
limits of Trenton promises not to open a competing business any-
where within the state of New Jersey, the restriction is much
greater than is reasonable. This is a good reason for refusing to
enjoin the seller from doing business in Newark; but it is not a good
reason for permitting him to open up a competing store within the
same block in Trenton. 6A Corbin, Contracts § 1390 at 66 (1962).
And, at 104:
As in the case of contracts restraining the seller of a business with
its good will, the fact that the restriction on an employee goes too
far to be valid as a whole does not prevent a court from enforcing
it in part insofar as it is reasonable and not oppressive. The injunc-
tion may be made operative only as to reasonable space and time;
*** 6A Corbin, Contracts § 1394 (1962).
Professor Williston's comments on the subject are as follows:
If a sharply defined line separated a restraint which is excessive
territorially from such restraint as is permissible, there seems no
reason why effect should not be given to a restrictive promise indi-
visible in terms, to the extent that it is lawful. If it be said that
the attempt to impose an excessive restraint invalidates the whole
promise, a similar attempt should invalidate a whole contract,
though the promises are in terms divisible. Questions involving
legality of contracts should not depend on form. Public policy
surely is not concerned to distinguish differences of wording in
agreements of identical meaning. 5 Williston, Contracts § 1660
(rev. ed. 1937).
73 Wash. 2d 307, 313-14, 438 P.2d 587, 591 (1968).
"S Ehlers v. Iowa Warehouse Co., 188 N.W.2d 368, 374 (Iowa 1971) (Becker, J., dis-
senting); Hamilton v. Wosepka, 261 Iowa 299, 154 N.W.2d 164 (1967); Comment,
Contracts-Partial Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants, 50 N.C.L. Rxv. 689 (1972).
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determines is just under the circumstances, thereby preventing a
party from totally abandoning his contractual obligation. 7
The most striking aspect of the Colorado treatment of partial
enforcement is the failure of the state's highest court to follow the
doctrine in Knoebel Mercantile Co. v. Siders, 11 a situation in
which it seemed ideally appropriate. In that case, Siders took a
job in the Colorado Springs area, signed a noncompetition agree-
ment with Knoebel which covered virtually the entire Rocky
Mountain area and then left to join a Colorado Springs competi-
tor." Partial enforcement in Colorado Springs would have fully
protected Knoebel and considerably lessened the potential hard-
ship on Siders, but it appears that the court simply decided that
no covenant was justified under the circumstances, no matter
how reasonable its terms.'"' This case then suggests the possibility
that Colorado courts may practice a kind of selective partial en-
forcement so that in a close case an overly broad covenant may
result in no enforcement at all.
D. Critique of Colorado Common Law
In Zeff, Farrington & Associates v. Farrington,1°' decided a
few months after Knoebel, the court backed away from the bal-
ancing approach of Knoebel and Goldammer'0° and returned to
its practice of enforcing restrictive covenants with little attention
to competing interests. The court stated:
The rule is well-settled in Colorado that reasonable covenants
not to compete will be enforced and that what is reasonable depends
g7 Corbin, A Comment on Beit v. Beit, 23 CONN. B.J. 43 (1949); Williston, A Note on
Beit v. Beit, 23 CONN. B.J. 40 (1949); see Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 270 Wis. 133,
70 NW.2d 585 (1955).
" 168 Colo. 48, 449 P.2d 813 (1968). See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
" NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of Employer's hiring Em-
ployee and for other good and valuable consideration, Employee promises
and agrees that in the event of the termination of his said employment for
any reason whatsoever, for a period of two years from and after the date of
such termination he will not, directly or indirectly, either as an owner, offi-
cer, employee, agent or otherwise, engage in the institutional food, paper and
supply business, bakery supply business, and janitorial supply business, or
any part thereof in all or any part of the State of Colorado, Wyoming, Mon-
tana, New Mexico, Nebraska, Kansas, So. Dakota, and any other State in
which Employer transacts its business at any time up to the date of such
employment termination. ...
165 Colo. at 394-95, 439 P.2d at 356.
'0* Cf. Gulick v. A. Robert Strawn & Assocs., 477 P.2d 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970) where
the court used similar analysis.
101 68 Colo. 48, 449 P.2d 813 (1969).
"02 See text accompanying notes 68-80 supra.
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upon the facts of each case. We deem it significant that in 9 out of
10 cases cited, the court upheld the enforceability of the noncompe-
titive covenant. This substantial precedent evinces the court's un-
willingness to search out legal excuses for a willful and deliberate
violation of a reasonable covenant not to compete. We here declare
renewed approval of this precedent. 03
The court then proceeded, after a relatively sketchy analysis of
the covenantor's experience and access to confidential informa-
tion, to declare that an agreement restricting competition for 3
years within a 200-mile radius of Denver was reasonable, giving
no explicit consideration to the potential hardships that were
thereby imposed on the defendant.
The next, and most recent decision of the Colorado Supreme
Court, Jim Sprague's Aetna Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Hruz, "I embod-
ied all that is objectionable in the Colorado common law and
demonstrates why legislative reform seemed necessary. In that
case the trial court had denied both damages and an injunction
to a mobile home company in an action brought pursuant to a
noncompetition covenant against an ex-salesman. The covenan-
tor, Hruz, left his job with Jim Sprague's Aetna Trailer Sales
after 4 months and went to work for a rival company. During the
first 2 months on his new job in which he sold a total of 7 or 8
trailers, he dealt with one customer who knew him from his pre-
vious position. The court placed some emphasis on the fact that
Hruz was a retired military man who had very little sales experi-
ence and no mobile home sales experience prior to working for the
plaintiff. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial court,
which had denied the issuance of an injunction, and remanded
with instructions to enter an injunction in conformity with the
covenant.
While there were factual distinctions between Knoebel and
Jim Sprague's,0 the court failed to note, much less discuss, the
significance of such distinctions. Instead, it rested its decision on
three bases: (1) the territorial and chronological limits of the
Hruz covenant were less than those which had been approved in
other cases; (2) Hruz failed as a matter of law to carry the burden
of proving that the covenant was unreasonable; and (3) Hruz
1 168 Colo. at 50, 449 P.2d at 814 (citations omitted).
11 172 Colo. 469, 474 P.2d 216 (1970).
1" For example, Siders was an experienced salesman, while Hruz was not. For a
discussion of Knoebel, see text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
1975
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
signed a valid covenant with full knowledge of its significance.
The Jim Sprague's decisions is also puzzling because the lower
court's denial of monetary damages was affirmed, leaving one to
wonder how the likelihood of irreparable harm was established if
no actual damages had resulted from an extended period of
breach.
Since the Jim Sprague's decision, eight other cases have been
decided under Colorado law, none of which have denied injunc-
tive relief on substantive grounds. The courts have continually
emphasized that each case must be determined on its own facts
and circumstances; but even where such facts and circumstances
are relatively similar, the courts have sometimes arrived at differ-
ent conclusions. For instance, in Wagner v. A & B Personnel
Systems, Ltd., '" the court limited the enforcement of a restrictive
covenant to an area within 50 miles of Denver. In the same year,
another division of the court of appeals"°7 considered a noncompe-
tition covenant which restrained an employee in the same line of
business from competing within a radius of 35 miles of any of the
employer's offices. The court modified the territorial restriction
to enforce the covenant within an area 10 miles from the bounda-
ries of Denver. It is difficult to explain an analysis which permits
a conclusion that a 50-mile radius is reasonable for one employee
and a 10-mile radius is reasonable for another engaged in the
same type work.
In summary it can be said that the express Colorado rule is
in accord with the Restatement of Contracts, although "reason-
able" in Colorado often seems to be construed as meaning little
more than "validly entered into." Once this determination is
made, courts seem to consider little else. Only Goldammer and
Knoebel exhibit an attempt to weigh the hardship on the coven-
antor against the benefit to the covenantee, and many cases
hardly seem to consider whether the covenantee even needs the
protection.
It therefore appears that there are at least two valid grounds
for criticizing the Colorado cases: (1) the decisions have not been
altogether consistent; and (2) there is a tendency to enforce non-
competition agreements without sufficient consideration of the
rights of, and the potential hardship to, the covenantor.
473 P.2d 179 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970).
' Gulick v. A. Robert Strawn & Assocs., 477 P.2d 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970).
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III. STATUTORY REFORM OF COLORADO COMMON LAW
Against the background of the common law described above,
in 1973 the legislature enacted an amendment to the Colorado
statute which now provides:
(2) Any covenant not to compete which restricts the right of any
person to receive compensation for performance of skilled or un-
skilled labor for any employer shall be void, but this subsection (2)
shall not apply to:
(a) Any contract for the purchase and sale of a business or
the assets of a business;
(b) Any contract for the protection of trade secrets;
(c) Any contractual provision providing for recovery of the
expense of educating and training an employee who has served
an employer for a period of less than two years;
(d) Executive and management personnel and officers and
employees who constitute professional staff to executive and
management personnel.108
The amendment declares a narrowly defined class of covenants
void, leaving all others subject to the existing judicial tests of
reasonableness. 109
Although several other states have passed statutes limiting
noncompetition covenants, section 113 differs substantially in
language and in substance from all of them. Five states-
California, Montana, Oklahoma, North Dakota, and Michigan
-have adopted statutes declaring every restrictive covenant
void except when given in connection with a sale of business
goodwill or the dissolution of a partnership."0 Two other states
-Florida and Alabama-have similar laws, but also permit
noncompetition covenants ancillary to employment contracts.",
Louisiana forbids restrictive covenants between employers and
employees except to the extent that restrictions may be justified
COLO. REy. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2) (1973) [hereinafter referred to as section 113].
As of this writing, no appellate case has interpreted section 113 and, accordingly,
much of the following discussion of the statute is necessarily speculative.
- CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600-02 (West 1964) (enacted in 1872; amended in
1945 to include sale of stock by a shareholder; amended in 1963 to delineate further the
nature of sales in which covenants not to compete are permissible, particularly with
respect to the sale of a subsidiary); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.761, .766 (1967)
(enacted in 1905); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 13-807 to 809 (1947) (derived from California
Civil Code and enacted in 1895); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1959) (derived from Califor-
nia Civil Code and enacted in 1877); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 217-19 (1966) (enacted
in 1890).
" ALA. CODE tit. 9, §§ 22-24 (1958) (enacted in 1923 and amended in 1931 to provide
exceptions in favor of purchaser of good will and employer); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.12
(1972) (enacted in 1953).
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by training or advertising expenses." 2 The South Dakota statute
has exemptions for sales and partnership dissolution and also
permits employment covenants between practitioners who must
be duly licensed by the state." 3 Wisconsin declares all noncompe-
tition contracts which are ancillary to employment contracts void
except those reasonably necessary for the protection of the em-




The differences between these statutes and Colorado's may
be better appreciated by a detailed comparison between section
113 and the operative language of the Oklahoma statute, which
is typical of other states:
Every contract by which any one is restrained from exercising
a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, otherwise than as
provided by the next two sections, is to that extent void."'
The operative portion of section 113 states:
Any covenant not to compete which restricts the right of any person
to receive compensation for performance of skilled or unskilled labor
for any employer shall be void .... -
There are three significant differences between the Oklahoma
statute and section 113: (1) the Oklahoma statute affects "every
contract by which anyone is restrained" while section 113 voids
"any covenant not to compete which restricts"; (2) the Oklahoma
statute applies to restrictions on "a profession, trade, or busi-
ness" while section 113 is limited to "performance of skilled or
unskilled labor"; and (3) the Oklahoma statute voids any agree-
ment which would restrain one from "exercising" specified activi-
ties while section 113 only protects the right to receive compensa-
tion from an employer.
1. Noncompetition Covenant
Is there any difference between a "covenant not to compete"
and a contract by which one is restrained from engaging in certain
I LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (1964) (enacted in 1934; 1962 amendment added a
training and advertising exception; restraint limited to 2 years and employee's territory
or route).
113 S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 53-9-8 to -11 (1969) (enacted in 1877; employee
covenant may not restrain activity for more than 10 years or for more than a 25-mile radius
from employer's principal place of business).
"' WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (1974) (enacted in 1957).
... OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 217 (1966) (footnote omitted).
,I' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2) (1973).
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activities? A restraint includes any contractual obligation which
may discourage one from entering into competitive activity. For
example, it may include loss of accrued but unpaid commis-
sions," loss of retirement or profit sharing incentives,"18 and simi-
lar penalties which discourage but do not forbid one from entering
into competition."9 A "covenant not to compete," on the other
hand, might be described as including only an absolute ban on
engaging in competitive activity. The distinction, arguably, is
between a covenant which discourages competition and a cove-
nant which forbids competition.
A "covenant not to compete" does not have any precise legal
definition. The only other state statute which uses language com-
parable to section 113 is that of Wisconsin which refers to "[a]
covenant by an assistant, servant or agent not to compete with
his employer.' ' 20 Courts which have applied this language have
concluded, with relatively little analysis, that a covenant not to
compete is synonymous with a contract which restrains competi-
tion.' 2' Thus, the Wisconsin courts have held that an agreement
" See, e.g., Buskuhl v. Family Life Ins. Co., 271 Cal. App. 2d 514, 76 Cal. Rptr. 602
(1969), which held that a covenant conditioning an insurance agent's rights to continue
receiving unaccrued commissions on non-interference with his ex-employer was not a
restraint of trade within the meaning of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1964).
"I See, e.g., Couch v. Administrative Comm. of Defco Labs., Inc. Salaried Employees
Profit Sharing Trust, 44 Mich. App. 44, 205 N.W.2d 24 (1972) (forfeiture of profit sharing
benefits not restraint within Michigan statute). But see Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley
Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 239, 398 P.2d 147, 42 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1965); Frame v. Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1971) (forfeiture of rights
under profit sharing plan is a restraint of trade within meaning of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 16600 (West 1964)). See also Comment, Forfeiture of Pension Benefits for Violation of
Covenants Not to Compete, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 290 (1966); Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1246 (1968).
However, this issue has' been resolved for plans covered by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974. Section 203 of the Act requires that benefits be nonforfeitable
and hence not conditioned upon the post-employment activities of the employee. Pub. L.
No. 93-406, § 203 (Sept. 2, 1974), to be codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1053.
"I Mackie v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 13 Mich. App. 556, 164 N.W.2d 777
(1968) (loss of special benefits upon competition is a restraint within the Michigan stat-
ute); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Balistrieri, 19 Wis. 2d 265, 129 N.W.2d 126 (1963)
(requirement to return advances if covenantor subsequently competes is restraint within
Wisconsin statute). Contra, Geiss v. Northern Ins. Agency, 153 N.W.2d 688 (N.D. 1967)
(payment of renewal commissions conditioned on noncompetition is not restraint within
North Dakota statute).
m WIs. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (1974).
Schroeder v. Gateway Transp. Co., 53 Wis. 2d 59, 191 N.W.2d 860 (1971) (amend-
ment of noncontributory pension plan, eliminating eligibility of retired employees who
subsequently work for competitors held to be an unreasonable covenant not to compete);
Holsen v. Marshal & Ilsley Bank, 52 Wis. 2d 281, 190 N.W.2d 189 (1971) (amendment to
profit sharing and retirement plan, providing that participating employee who intended
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depriving a former employee of pension or other retirement rights
as a result of subsequent competitive activities is void under the
Wisconsin statute.' The Wisconsin view is reasonable because
the policy of the statute to avoid unwarranted interferences with
freedom of employment is enforced by voiding all covenants
which indirectly restrict that freedom even though the covenants
do not amount to complete prevention of competitive activity. It
is likely that a Colorado court would reach a similar decision
under section 113(c), the indirect restraint of the recovery of
training expenses. This one indirect restraint implies that other
indirect restrictions are not permissible.
2 3
2. Skilled or Unskilled Labor
The term "skilled or unskilled labor" is not found in any
other statute which affects restrictive covenants. Since "skilled
or unskilled labor" is not defined anywhere in section 113,124 one
must look outside of the statute for a definition. There are vastly
different definitions of the term labor. For example, labor has
been defined as signifying "physical or mental labor under any
circumstances, and in its broadest sense the term is not confined
to physical or manual labor, but includes every possible human
exertion, mental or physical, and even spiritual.' 1 5 On the other
hand, the term "has been defined as purely physical toil."'2 6 It
does not appear useful to discuss the various definitions which
might be used and which are generally derived from fields as
diverse as workmen's compensation, labor relations law, and tax-
ation. 27 What is of significance in defining the scope of section
to engage in competitive activity should receive only 50% of his vested participating
interest in plan, violated statute); Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Balistrieri, 19 Wis. 2d 265,
120 N.W.2d 126 (1963) (insurance agent's employment contract requiring agent who com-
petes upon termination of employment to repay all advances by employer on commissions
held invalid under statute).
122 Schroeder v. Gateway Transp. Co., 53 Wis. 2d 59, 191 N.W.2d 860 (1971); Holsen
v. Marshal & Ilsley Bank, 52 Wis. 2d 281, 190 N.W.2d 189 (1971).
"2 House Hearings, supra note 6, infer that pension plans would not be affected by
section 113.
12 But see CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-16-101(2) (1973), which defines skilled labor
and unskilled labor for purposes of classifying workmen, mechanics and laborers in
connection with certain public contracts.
121 51 C.J.S. Labor at 544 (1967).
132 48 Am. Jun. 2d Labor & Labor Relations § 1 at 49 (1970).
12 Buckley v. Gibney, 332 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Immigration & Nationality
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(6) (1970); Addicott v. Upton, 26 Mich. App. 523, 182 N.W.2d 790
(1970) (action against stockholders by former employees to recover unpaid wages under
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2908 (1968); Gabin v. Skyline Cabana Club, 54 N.J. 550,
258 A.2d 6 (1969) (child labor law, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34: 2-21.1, .17 (1965); People v.
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113 is the intent and purpose of the statute taken as a whole. The
reports of the committee hearings on section 113 indicate that,
although the committee was primarily concerned with skilled
workers such as plumbers and electricians, the words used were
intended to cover a much wider range of activities.' 9 More signifi-
cantly, in considering the original proposal for section 113 the
committee added subsection (e) exempting "executive and man-
agement personnel and officers and employees who constitute
professional staff" from the treatment of the main section.' 9 This
exception would serve no purpose unless executive and manage-
ment personnel and professional staff would otherwise be in-
cluded in the coverage of the statute. It therefore appears that a
broad definition of "skilled and unskilled labor" is justified. This
is, however, an area of some question, subject to definitive judi-
cial construction.
3. Compensation . . .Employer
The only contracts which are invalidated by section 113 are
those which would restrain one from "receiving compensation for
performance of skilled or unskilled labor for any employer." The
Oklahoma language, "engaging in a lawful profession, trade or
business," is clearly broader for the statute also protects the right
of the covenantor to enter into a partnership, to become an inves-
tor, director or officer, or to participate in any other way, directly
or indirectly, in a competitive business. The Colorado statute
therefore applies to a much narrower set of circumstances.
There are ambiguities and problems even here however. For
example, could an individual subject to an otherwise valid re-
strictive covenant., set up a family owned corporation, cause the
corporation to employ him and then claim the protection of the
statutory provision voiding any covenant which forbids him from
entering "the performance of skilled or unskilled labor for an
employer"? It is unlikely that a Colorado court would permit the
Aliprantis, 8 App. Div. 2d 276, 187 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1959) (Sunday closing law, N.Y. PENAL
CODE OF 1909 § 2143 [repealed N.Y. PENAL CODE § 500.05 (1967)]); San Marco Constr.
Corp. v. Gilbert, 15 Misc. 2d 208, 178 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1958) (mechanic's lien, N.Y. LIEN
LAW §§ 2, 9(7), (12)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1966); Kline v. Federal Ins. Co., 60 Ohio Op.
2d 445, 152 N.E.2d 911 (C.P. 1958) (contractor's bond statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
153.54 (Page 1969).
I" See House Hearings, supra note 6. It is important to note, however, that the draft
under discussion at that time contained the additional words "or provision of other serv-
ices." Therefore, it may be argued that the inclusion of professions such as physicians was
included in "other services" and not "skilled and unskilled labor."
I" See Senate Hearings, supra note 6.
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intent of section 113 to be circumvented so easily. 3 0 More difficult
cases may arise, however, where the covenantor puts himself into
the position of being, at least in a technical legal sense, an em-
ployee in an effort to take advantage of the statutory protection.
B. Specific Exceptions
1. Purchase and Sale Exception
Subparagraph (b), the exemption of covenants in connection
with the sale of business goodwill, resembles the exception which
is almost universally included in other restrictive covenant legis-
lation. While the thrust of section 113 is similar to that of most
other statutes, the language and the effect are different. For ex-
ample, the Oklahoma law provides as follows:
Restraint of trade-Exception as to sale of good-will.
One who sells the good-will of a business may agree with the
buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within a speci-
fied county, city or part thereof, so long as the buyer, or any person
deriving title to the good-will from him carries on a like business
therein."'
The exemption in the Colorado statute is broader because it ap-
plies to the purchase and sale of a business or business assets
instead of to a sale of goodwill only. Thus, the sale of the physical
assets of a discontinued business not involving goodwill might fall
within the scope of subparagraph (a) of section 113. Similarly,
while the typical statutes apply only to sales, section 113 refers
to purchases and sales, suggesting that the vendee as well as the
vendor could be bound by a noncompetition covenant.
3
1
The primary ambiguity of this exemption is the scope of the
language "purchase and sale." For example, a question arises
whether a noncompetition covenant may be enforced in connec-
tion with the dissolution of a partnership, a corporate reorganiza-
tion which amounts to a transfer of corporate assets, a lease,
" For an example of a Colorado court refusing to allow a covenantor to circumvent
the law see Weber v. Nonpareil Baking Co., 85 Colo. 232, 274 P. 932 (1929). After signing
a covenant restraining him from engaging in the retail bakery business, Weber organized
a family corporation, capitalized it, entered its employ, solicited business for it, advised
as to its management, held himself out to the public as a party in interest, and partici-
pated in its profits. The court found that by so doing, he had completely circumvented
the contract and enjoined him from all of the above activities.
"1 OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 218 (1966).
"' It is not clear, however, to what extent the common law would enforce a covenant
against a vendee. Possible situations might include covenants in conjunction with the
purchase of stock by a corporate employee or the purchase of a franchise by a franchisee.
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franchise, license, or similar agreement. Neither the statutory
language nor the existing case law provides much guidance in this
area. It may be argued that the test should be whether the trans-
action is substantially equivalent to the sale of a business or
business assets. For example, the withdrawal of a partner from a
partnership should be analyzed on the facts of the particular
case. 33 If one partner were to sell substantial assets in conjunction
with a restrictive covenant, the covenant should probably be en-
forced. On the other hand, if the withdrawing partner were to
have a relatively minor interest in the partnership assets so that
his position was more like that of an employee, his withdrawal
should not be considered substantially equivalent to a sale. 13
Similarly, if a corporate merger or reorganization were considered
an acquisition by one company of the assets of another, the own-
ers of the acquired corporation should be treated like any other
sellers and a covenant pursuant to the merger should be en-
forced. 135
"3 See Brown v. Stough, 292 P.2d 176 (Okla. 1956), in which the court held that the
sale of a withdrawing physician/partner to new partners and repurchase of his interests
by remaining partners were sales within meaning of Oklahoma statute exempting sale of
the goodwill of a business. While it seems clear that a withdrawal of one partner from the
partnership and the consequent sale of his interest is within section 113, the final dissolu-
tion of a partnership and distribution of its assets to all of the partners is probably not.
Significantly, most other statutes have separate exemptions for sales and for partnership
dissolutions. If dissolution were considered a sale, the separate dissolution exception
would be unnecessary. But see, Jenson v. Olson, 144 Mont. 224, 395 P.2d 465 (1964).
134 Bernstein, Bernstein, Wile & Gordon v. Ross, 22 Mich. App. 117, 177 N.W.2d 193
(1970) (repurchase by accounting partnership of 5 percent interest in partnership held not
sale of good will within Michigan statute as withdrawing partner, having no clients or
separate business of his own, had no goodwill to sell); cf. Buckhout v. Witwer, 157 Mich.
406, 122 N.W. 184 (1909); Key v. Perkins, 173 Okla. 99, 46 P.2d 530 (1935); Public Opinion
Publishing Co. v. Ransom, 34 S.D. 381, 148 N.W. 838 (1914). Contra Bessel v. Bethke, 56
N.D. 1, 215 N.W. 868 (1927); Vogue Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Berkowitz, 292 Mich. 575,
291 N.W. 12 (1940) (corporation's purchase of 26 shares of its own stock held sale within
MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.766 (1967)). See also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600-02
(West 1964), which was amended in 1945 to include a stock transfer in its "sale" exemp-
tion.
' Farren v. Autoviable Serv. Inc., 508 P.2d 646 (Okla. 1973) held that a covenant
not to compete, executed by an employee of a merged corporation prior to the merger was
pursuant to a "sale." Disregarding definitions of sales from other contexts, the court said:
We do not believe that an actual cash sale of good will was the para-
mount reason for inclusion of this statute in the law of this State. We believe
that the purpose of this statute is to allow the parties to the transfer of a
going business to mutually agree, as a part of the value of the business
transferred, that the transferee will be protected from his transferor who
might use his previously acquired experience, contacts and expertise to pro-
mote his own interests in the same field of business in competition with his
transferee (citation omitted).
In this case there was a corporate merger. The good will of Farren Coin-
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A more difficult problem is posed by the typical franchise
agreement. The sale of a franchise is substantially equivalent to
a sale of business assets; the franchisor sells to the franchisee the
right to use a trade name, goodwill, and the benefits of advertis-
ing in a specified area. The franchisee should therefore have
rights similar to a vendee in a classic purchase agreement to
enforce a noncompetition covenant against the franchisor. On the
other hand, the franchisor should have a right similar to that of
an employer to prevent competition to the extent that it is based
on training, trade secrets, or goodwill acquired from the franchi-
see.'36 The latter seems to be the approach taken by the court in
Goldammer v. Fay.'37
2. Training and Education Exception
Another exemption in the Colorado statute which has a par-
allel in another statute is subparagraph (c), excepting "any con-
tractual provision providing for recovery of the expense in educat-
ing and training an employee who has served an employer for a
period of less than two years."' 38 This somewhat resembles the
provision of the Louisiana statute which voids restraints on com-
petition except, among other things, "where the employer incurs
an expense in the training of the employee."' 3
There are two distinctions between the Colorado statute and
the Louisiana statute which are of crucial importance. First, the
effect of the Colorado statute is limited to the initial 2-year period
of employment. An employee who terminates his employment
after such 2-year period is unaffected by this provision. Second,
and most important, Colorado apparently does not permit the
general enforcement of post-employment restraints merely be-
cause the employer has incurred training expenses, but permits
the use of such restraints only as a sanction to the extent neces-
pany with Farren's consent was included in the corporate entity that merged
with Autoviable, the surviving corporation, and thus transferred to it. We
believe that this is a "sale" of the good will within the meaning of 15
O.S.1971 § 218.
508 P.2d at 648. On the other hand, assignments and leases are probably not sales within
the meaning of section 113(a). See Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson, 209 U.S. 423
(1908) (dictum that lease not sale within Oklahoma statute); E.W. Smith Agency v.
Sanger, 350 Mich. 75, 85 N.W.2d 84 (1957) (assignment of right to receive commissions).
3I See Annot. 50 A.L.R.3d 746 (1973) supporting the view that a franchise agreement
is similar to an employment contract. See also Blake at 666.
137 326 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1964). See text accompanying notes 68-71 supra.
131 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2)(c) (1973).
" LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (1964).
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sary to compel the employee to repay such expenses. Once the
employee-convenantor reimburses his former employer he is free
of the bonds of the noncompetition covenant.
Louisiana courts have split drastically in their interpretation
of what kind of training is required to bring an employment rela-
tionship within the exception to the general avoidance law, and
the Louisiana Supreme Court has not yet resolved the differences
among its lower courts. At the present time, the federal courts
and one of the intermediate appellate courts in Louisiana have
interpreted the provision to apply only where the expenses in-
curred by the employer are of an unusual nature and perhaps only
where the training has the effect of making the employee a spe-
cialist in his field. "' The other three Louisiana intermediate ap-
pellate courts have held that almost any expenditure will bring
the employee within the statutory exception."'
The Louisiana minority position appears to represent the
better view for almost any employee receives at least some initial
training by his supervisors. Moreover, the structure of section
113, which only permits enforcement of the covenant as a penalty
for failure to reimburse the employer's expenses, suggests that
such expenses must be readily identifiable. Thus, for example, an
employer could recover the cost of sending an employee to a
company-run school, but it is doubtful that the employer could
establish with certainty the amount of training and education
expenses which constitute that part of the employer's general
administrative overhead.
10 Otis Eng'r Corp. v. Guimbellot, 450 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1971) (20 days schooling
costing roughly $2,000 insufficient to justify enforcement of 5-year covenant not to com-
pete within 100-mile radius of place of employment); Theatre Time Clock, Inc. v. Stewart,
276 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. La. 1967) (training expenses of on-the-job training for 2 weeks
insufficient to justify enforcement of 3-year noncompetition clause); Standard Brands,
Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967) (covenant not enforcible because no
substantial training expenses shown); National Motor Club v. Conque, 173 So. 2d 238,
242 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1965) (training expenses, described as "nominal so-called train-
ing expenses . . . incurred some 3 or 4 months after initial employment," consisting of
supervision and sales meetings insufficient to justify enforcement of the covenant).
" Covenants not to compete were enforced in National School Studios, Inc. v. Bar-
rios, 236 So. 2d 309 (La. Ct. App. 1970) (training expenses consisted of sending salesmen
to Barrios' office to assist him on three occasions, a week's training in Memphis, and
payment of salary before payment justified by earnings); World Wide Health Studios, Inc.
v. Desmond, 222 So. 2d 517 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1969) (5-year covenant not to compete
in 100-mile radius enforced on basis of intensive 2 weeks of training and several weeks of
being a "manager trainee"); Aetna Fin. Co. v. Adams, 170 So. 2d 740 (La. Ct. App. 1st




3. Trade Secrets Exception
Section 113, unlike comparable statutes in other jurisdic-
tions, permits noncompetition covenants for the protection of
trade secrets. "2 A trade secret is commonly defined as "any for-
mula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used
in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain
an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.'1 The
factors relevant in identifying trade secrets include: (1) the degree
of secrecy, (2) the extent to which measures are taken to maintain
secrecy, (3) the amount of effort or costs required to develop the
secrets, and (4) the degree of difficulty required by others to
duplicate the secrets.' Trade secrets were defined by the Colo-
rado Supreme Court in Julius Hyman & Co. v. Velsicol Corp.'
as follows:
Generally it may be said that a trade secret is any plan or
process known only to its owner, and those of his employees to whom
it is necessary to confide it. It is not necessary that the plan or
process be patentable."'
It has long been recognized that traditional common law
remedies do not afford adequate legal protection for proprietary
information because of the problems of identifying trade secrets
and determining when they are being used by the competitor.'47
Therefore, the use of restrictive covenants to protect trade secrets
has been accepted on the theory that if an employee is prohibited
from competing or working for a competitor, he will have no op-
portunity to use or divulge his former employer's trade secrets. "8
"' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2)(b) (1973). See text accompanying notes 108-
10 supra. But see Trans-American Collections, Inc. v. Continental Acct. Servicing House,
Inc., 342 F. Supp. 1303 (D. Utah 1972) where the court in dictum stated that a noncompe-
tition covenant to protect trade secrets is valid under California statute although the
statute itself does not expressly permit a trade secrets exemption.
"I RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b at 5 (1939).
144 Id.
"4 123 Colo. 563, 233 P.2d 977 (1951).
" Id. at 605, 233 P.2d at 999. See Knoebel Mercantile Co. v. Siders, 165 Colo. 393,
439 P.2d 355 (1968) for an excellent discussion of what is not a trade secret.
"41 See Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967); Bender,
Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 909 (1970); Comment, The
Scott Amendment to the Patent Revision Act: Should Trade Secrets Receive Federal
Protection?, 31 Wis. L. REv. 900 (1971).
"I See Schneider & Halstrom, Trade Secret Protection in Massachusetts, 56 MASS.
L.Q. 239 (1971); Note, Protection of Trade Secrets in Florida: Are Present Remedies
Adequate?, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 721 (1972). For an evaluation of covenants not to compete
as vehicles for protecting trade secrets see Note, Trade Secret Protection of Non-Technical
Competitive Information, 54 IowA L. REv. 1164 (1969). State common law, however, is not
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It is possible that, as with training expenses, almost all em-
ployees have access to some trade secret information.'49 At one
extreme it would be unfair to permit a mere recital of the exist-
ence of trade secrets to bring a covenant within the statutory
exemption. On the other hand, it should not be necessary for a
covenantee to prove that a covenantor actually took, or intends
to take, or inevitably will take, trade secrets and use them impro-
perly, for this would force the plaintiff to carry the same difficult
burden of proof that he would have in a suit grounded on a trade
secret theory absent any restrictive covenant.' 5
The better view of subparagraph (b) would therefore seem to
be that one asserting a restrictive covenant must show some logi-
cal relationship between the existence of trade secrets in his busi-
ness and the enforcement of post-employment restraints on the
covenantor. This could be done by establishing (1) that there are
significant trade secrets in his business, (2) that the covenantor
had access to such trade secrets, and (3) that there is some likeli-
hood that such trade secrets will be used by the covenantor if he
goes into competition.
4. Management and Professional Staff Exception
The exemption set forth in subparagraph (d) applies to two
classes of individuals, "executive and management personnel and
officers" and the "professional staff" of management. The term
officers may seem clear, although it could be rather inclusive in
the case, for example, of a large bank with numerous vice presi-
dents. The meaning of management and executive personnel may
also seem relatively precise, but individuals as diverse as the
always adequate to protect trade secrets. See Blake at 657, 670; Note, An Employer's
Competitive Restraints on Former Employees, 17 DnAKE L. REv. 69 (1967).
,' For example, some but not all customer lists are trade secrets. See Suburban Gas
of Grand Junction, Inc. v. Bockelman, 157 Colo. 78, 401 P.2d 268 (1965). However, the
usual definitions of trade secrets are broad enough to create a very substantial class of
employees who might fall within the ambit of subparagraph (e).
"m See Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967), citing
Note, Injunctions to Protect Trade Secrets-The Goodrich and DuPont Cases, 51 VA. L.
Rsv. 917 (1965) which says:
An employer seeking injunctive protection for his trade secrets prior to their
disclosure generally makes one or more of the following three allegations: (1)
that the defecting employee actually intends to divulge secrets in his posses-
sion; (2) that the defecting employee will inevitably reveal some trade se-
crets, whether consciously or not, just because of the type of work in which
he will be involved; (3) that there is a substantial probability of disclosure
by the defecting employee in his new employment.
51 VA. L. REv. at 922.
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operating engineer of a large power plant,'5 ' foremen,'52 superin-
tendents,'53 engineers,'54 chemists,' 5  office managers,' 6 paymas-
ters,' 7 and cashiers' 8 have all been considered executive or man-
agement personnel in some cases.' 59 "Professional staff" is equally
ambiguous. Does this include, for example, clerks, secretaries,
and stenographers, or is it directed at accountants, engineers, and
the like?'60 Even aside from its obvious ambiguities, subpara-
graph (d) appears to be the most inexplicable provision of section
113. Its purpose is not to protect trade secrets or to recover train-
ing expenses for these matters are adequately covered in other
portions of the statute. Subparagraph (d), therefore, must be
intended simply to protect employers from the disruption of oper-
ations which occur upon the loss of a key executive or member of
his staff.'"' It is by no means clear, either as a matter of public
policy or as a matter of fairness to the individuals involved, that
discrimination on this basis is justified. On the other hand, it
might be argued that this exception can be justified on the basis
that such individuals almost always have access to confidential
information and other intangible assets which deserve protection.
However, the reason for this exception, as opposed to the rational-
ization, seems to be that employers want to retain these key
personnel because of their extreme importance to the company.
If this is the case, then the use of post-employment restraints is
obviously a penalty and not a legitimate effort to prevent unfair
competition.
,5, Walling v. General Indus. Co., 330 U.S. 545 (1947).
,52 Smith v. Porter, 143 F.2d 292 (8th Cir. 1944).
113 Pugh v. Lindsay, 206 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1953).
' ' Allen v. Atlantic Co., 145 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1944).
155 Anderson v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 72 F. Supp. 639 (D. Minn. 1947).
Owin v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 42 F. Supp. 774 (S.D. Tex. 1941).
i Cintron Rivera v. Bull Insular Line, 164 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1947).
"' Kaczanowski v. Home State Bank, 77 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. Wis. 1948).
"' The Colorado Senate Judiciary Committee which drafted section 113 used a chef
as an example of a manager and executive. See Senate Hearings, supra note 6.
"Io In other contexts professionals have been broadly defined. See, e.g., Rausch v.
Wolf, 72 F. Supp. 658 (N.D. Ill. 1947) (accountant); People v. Maggi, 378 Ill. 595, 39
N.E.2d 317 (1942) (beautician); State v. Cohn, 184 La. 53, 165 So. 449 (1936) (mechanic);
(Voorhees v. Bates, 308 N.Y. 184, 124 N.E. 273 (1954) (musician).
"I This policy, however, was not articulated in either the House or Senate hearings.
See House & Senate Hearings, supra note 6. One large company had apparently expressed
some concern about the bill, causing the Senate committee to add subparagraphs (d) &
(e). The nature of the policy supporting the concern was never discussed beyond the
inconvenience to employers of the loss of such personnel.
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C. Summary of Section 113
In summary, section 113 should be judged against the back-
ground of what it was intended to accomplish. The legislature was
concerned about a limited group of working people who were
required to execute noncompetition agreements for no valid pur-
pose and were thereby subjected to severe limitations on their
subsequent employment. Section 113 therefore protects only the
right of one who performs skilled or unskilled labor to enter into
other employment, and it contains specific exemptions which
apply to virtually every situation in which a covenantee could
have a legitimate interest in preventing competition. The Colo-
rado legislature has not attempted to alter the overall policy of
Colorado common law; it has simply dredged out a very limited
safe harbor for certain employees.
Section 113 has a number of ambiguities which might have
been avoided by more careful draftsmanship and which will ulti-
mately have to be resolved by judicial construction. Some prob-
lems of this sort are no doubt inevitable in any statute and may
well be desirable from the point of view of allowing courts flexibil-
ity in applying the statute to changing circumstances. The larger
question is whether this sort of surgical approach to the common
law creates more problems than it solves.
IV. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
The problems for the practitioner drafting or litigating a non-
competition agreement under Colorado law 62 include both those
"2 The conflicts of law problems relating to restrictive covenants deserve a separate
article. For present purposes it should be simply noted that the standard contract clause
designating applicable law will probably be ineffective. The general rule expressed by
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAws § 187(2)(b) (1971) is:
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual
rights and duties will be applied even if the particular issue is one which the
parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement
directed to that issue, unless either
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary
to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater
interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particu-
lar issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of
the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by
the parties.
Noncompetition statutes have been found to reflect a strong public policy, and states will
not enforce covenants void under their laws regardless of the legality of said covenants
under the law of the state designated by the contract. Forney Indus., Inc. v. Andre, 246
F. Supp. 333 (D.N.D. 1965); May v. Mulligan, 36 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Mich. 1939), alf'd,
117 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 691 (1941); Frame v. Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 20 Cal. App. 3d 668, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1971); Auto Club Affili-
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which are inherent in the preexisting case law and those which
arise from the new statute. The following comments are ad-
dressed primarily to the lawyer who is drafting a noncompetition
agreement, although they should also be relevant to the lawyer
negotiating for the potential covenantor or for either party in
litigation.
A. Common Law Problems
Colorado common law favors the covenantee wishing to en-
force a noncompetition covenant. However, the broad thrust of
decisions upholding restrictive agreements should not obscure the
fact that Colorado purports to follow a conventional balancing
approach which occasionally has resulted in nonenforcement.
Similarly, the greater weight of Colorado authority follows the
doctrine of partial enforcement, thereby encouraging the drafts-
man to prepare a covenant as broad as his client wishes. Knoebel
Mercantile Co. v. Siders,6 3 however, suggests the grave possibil-
ity that in an appropriate case an excessive restriction may not
be enforced. Moreover, a problem exists in that Colorado law
offers no clear guidelines as to what is a reasonable geographic
area in a particular case. "
A restrictive covenant is not enforced as a penalty or as a
means of forcing a covenantor to continue his employment or
other association with the covenantee. Rather, the purpose is to
protect the covenantee from unfair competition, such as the pur-
chaser who is entitled to legal protection of the goodwill he has
purchased and the employer who needs protection from a disloyal
employee who would otherwise use training and confidential in-
formation obtained from the employer to compete with him. In
drafting and enforcing a noncompetition covenant, counsel
should therefore seek to insure that it is limited only to such
reasonable goals.'
ates, Inc. v. Donahey, 281 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973); Davis v. Ebsco Indus., Inc.,
150 So. 2d 460 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963). But cf. Grace v. Orkin Exterminating, Inc., 255
S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1953). Of course, nothing is lost by attempting to designate
the applicable law.
,13 165 Colo. 393, 439 P.2d 355 (1968). See text accompanying notes 72-73, 98-100
supra.
6, See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
'1 Even though a covenant is valid under the applicable statute, it must still meet
common law standards of reasonableness. See Holsen v. Marshall & Isley Bank, 52 Wis.
2d 281, 190 N.W.2d 189 (1971); Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, 98 N.W.2d
415 (1959). However, section 113 shifts the burden of proof significantly. Under Colorado
common law as in most jurisdictions, the burden of proving that the terms of a covenant
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B. Statutory Problems
The lawyer always hopes that a statute will at least eliminate
uncertainty. Section 113 does this to a limited degree by provid-
ing that certain covenants are clearly invalid. The extent of this
coverage, however, is uncertain because of statutory ambiguities.
In fact, it is not even clear whether section 113 applies to con-
tracts entered into prior to the effective date of the statute.16 It
is more certain, however, that the attorney can draft a provision
forbidding any covenantor from becoming a shareholder, partner,
owner, investor, trustee, director, receiver, etc., of or in any com-
petitive business without offending section 113.167
Since section 113 permits a full restrictive covenant between
the seller and buyer of a business, one should consider structuring
many other agreements so that the purchase and sale exception
may apply. For example, one could combine a buy-sell agreement
with a partnership agreement and insert a noncompetition cove-
nant in the buy-sell provision so that the covenant is given as
partial consideration for the purchase of a withdrawing partner's
assets.'68 In close corporations key employees often receive stock
or other ownership rights such as stock options, and a noncompe-
are unreasonable is on the covenantor: Taff v. Brayman, 518 P.2d 298 (Colo. Ct. App.
1974); 17A C.J.S., Contracts § 585 (1963). Hence, the covenant is deemed valid and
enforceable until the covenantor proves to the contrary. Section 113, on the other hand,
voids all covenants not to compete unless the covenant is within one of its four exceptions.
Therefore, the covenant is enforceable only if the covenantee meets his burden of proof
that the covenant is within one of the exceptions. See generally, 29 AM. JUR. 2d Evidence
§ 147 (1967).
I The general rule is that vested rights under existing contracts will not be impaired
by subsequent legislation. 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 171 (1964). No statute avoiding
restrictive covenants has 'ever been applied to covenants executed before the effective date
of the statute; however, it is certainly possible that a legislature acting pursuant to the
state's police power could invalidate an existing contract deemed illegal and against
public policy. See, e.g., Jamieson v. Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co., 128 Ind. 555, 28 N.E.
76 (1891); Heart v. East Tenn. Brewing Co., 121 Tenn. 69, 113 S.W. 364 (1908). The
standard safety clause of section 113 supports the view that the statute represents an
exercise of the state's police power. On the other hand, CoLo. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 135-1-
202 (1963) provides that "a statute is presumed to be prospective in operation".
"I This, of course, is the kind of language which is used in the usual noncompetition
agreement. See, e.g., Knoebel Mercantile Co. v. Siders, 165 Colo. 393, 439 P.2d 355 (1968);
Electrical Prod. Consol. v. Howell, 108 Colo. 370, 117 P.2d 1010 (1941); Barrows v.
McMurtry Mfg. Co., 54 Colo. 432, 131 P. 430 (1913). For standard noncompetition lan-
guage see 5 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, CURRENT LwaAL FoAms wmTH TAX AALYsis Form 12.01
(1974) at 12-1004: "the Employee will not ... directly or indirectly, own, manage, oper-
ate, control, be employed by, participate in, or be connected in any matter with the
ownership, management, operations, or control .
"I See note 133 supra.
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tition agreement could be required in consideration of the
exercise of such rights.' 5
The greatest uncertainty under section 113 arises in connec-
tion with agreements such as franchises, 170 licenses, and leases.
Where feasible, one might structure such transactions in a way
that arguably involves a purchase and sale. In such areas as licen-
ses and franchises, there is also the possibility of using the trade
secret exemption of subparagraph (b), and this, of course, should
be favored since it reflects a valid justification for a noncompeti-
tion covenant in these transactions.
There is a vast category of indirect restraints that might be
used in conjunction with an explicit agreement not to compete.
For example, in Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co. v.
Kappers,'7' a salesman agreed not to solicit clients of his former
employer for the purpose of selling group or franchise policies and
agreed not to attempt to induce the employer's clients to cancel
or fail to renew their existing policies.'7 2 Other indirect efforts to
discourage competition include denial of pension benefits to a
competing covenantor,' withholding of profit sharing distribu-
tions,' and denial of unaccrued sales commissions.' A court
- Vogue Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Berkowitz, 292 Mich. 575, 291 N.W. 12 (1940).
The sale of stock by a shareholder has been held a "sale" with statutes prohibiting
covenants not to compete except in connection with a sale of goodwill. See Buckhout v.
Witwer, 157 Mich. 406, 122 N.W. 184 (1909); Key v. Perkins, 173 Okla. 99, 46 P.2d 530
(1935); Bessel v. Bethke, 56 N.D. 1, 215 N.W. 868 (1927); Public Opinion Publishing Co.
v. Ransom, 34 S.D. 381, 148 N.W. 838 (1914). The California courts held to the contrary
in Merchants' Ad-Sign Co. v. Sterling, 124 Cal. 429, 57 P. 468 (1899), necessitating an
amendment to the California statute. See note 110 supra. However, none of these cases
refer to purchase of stock.
"I For a more detailed discussion of policy considerations in franchise agreements,
see text accompanying notes 136-37 supra.
" 488 P.2d 96 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
172 ***[Tlhe Soliciting Agent, hereby expressly covenants and agrees
that after termination of this agreement, for any reason, he shall not for a
period of two years thereafter, do nor shall he aid or abet others to do, any
of the following things: (1) sell, or attempt to sell, any form of accident or
health insurance to or on any of the Company's insureds under group or
franchise policies in the territory covered by this agreement, (2) induce, or
attempt to induce, any of the Company's insureds under group policies or
franchise policyholders to cancel, lapse or fail to renew their policies with the
Company in the territory covered by this agreement***
Id. at 97.
I See, e.g., Schroeder v. Gateway Transport. Co., 53 Wis. 2d 59, 191 N.W.2d 860
(1971). But see Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 203, Pub. L. No. 93-
406, § 203 (Sept. 2, 1974), to be codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1053, which makes covered pension
plans nonforfeitable regardless of subsequent acts of the employee.
14 See notes 118, 121 supra.
"I' See note 117 supra.
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might find some or all of such restraints to be, in effect, a cove-
nant not to compete and hence void. However, some of the sanc-
tions have been approved under other statutes which contain
provisions prohibiting covenants in restraint of trade, and, there-
fore, might be acceptable under the arguably more narrow lan-
guage of section 113.
The various covenants of a contract should be in separate
clauses, and the contract should have a severability provision so
that judicial avoidance of one covenant will not necessarily affect
all. Recitals in the contract might state that the covenantor en-
tered into the contract freely, for full consideration, and with full
knowledge of its consequences. '
The remaining question is, of course, to what extent the stat-
ute will affect existing common law."' The purpose of section 113
is clearly remedial, and the sponsoring committee expected it to
relieve employees of burdensome and unfair covenants. The Colo-
rado courts, on the other hand, have taken the view that there is
virtually a moral commandment that covenants are to be en-
forced in accordance with their terms whenever possible. Whether
the courts will apply section 113 broadly to invalidate covenants
the legislature found objectionable or whether section 113 will be
strictly construed to preserve the judicial policy of upholding con-
tracts cannot now be determined. However, the courts might do
"I The Colorado courts have never held that full understanding of the covenant by
the parties is necessary to its enforcement but have occasionally noted that the covenant
in question was knowledgeably signed or that the covenantor was represented by counsel.
See Jim Sprague's Aetna Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Hruz, 172 Colo. 469, 474 P.2d 216 (1970);
Zeff, Farrington & Assocs. v. Farrington, 168 Colo. 48, 449 P.2d 813 (1969); Gulick v. A.
Robert Strawn & Assocs., 477 P.2d 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970).
'" A brief survey of the Colorado cases indicates that at least 10 of the 23 covenants
enforced under common law would probably be enforced under section 113 either because
they involve a sale of a business or a covenantor who was a manager. Sale of business
cases: Cantrell v. Lemons, 119 Colo. 107, 200 P.2d 911 (1948). Weber v. Nonpareil Baking
Co., 85 Colo. 232, 274 P. 932 (1929); Garf v. Weitzman, 72 Colo. 132, 209 P. 809 (1922);
Barrow v. McMurtry Mfg. Co., 54 Colo. 432, 131 P. 430 (1913); Flower Haven, Inc. v.
Palmer, 502 P.2d 424 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972). Sale of partnership interest cases: Fuller v.
Brough, 159 Colo. 147, 411 P.2d 18 (1966); Ditus v. Beahm, 123 Colo. 550, 232 P.2d 184
(1951). Employment of manager cases: Whittenberg v. Williams, 110 Colo. 418, 135 P.2d
228 (1943); Taff v. Brayman, 518 P.2d 298 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); Gulick v. A. Robert
Strawn & Assocs., 477 P.2d 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970). The covenants in the other cases
could also be upheld if they were necessary to protect trade secrets, to enforce recovery
for training expenses, or if the statute were construed so as to make the covenantor the
type of key personnel included in subparagraph (d). Unfortunately, these matters cannot
be determined in the absence of judicial interpretation of section 113 and further facts
about the respective cases.
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well to recognize that section 113 represents a legitimate objec-
tion to the trend in Colorado common law.
CONCLUSION
The basic problem with Colorado's treatment of restrictive
covenants has not been in the statement of the common law rule
but in the judicial application of that rule. This judicial applica-
tion has sometimes been inconsistent and has often manifested a
tendency to enforce such covenants too readily.
Although section 113 provides complete protection to a cov-
enantor who is within its coverage, it suffers from ambiguities
which make the extent of that coverage uncertain and from ex-
press limitations of scope even if it is broadly construed. These
problems illustrate the difficulties of trying to reform judicial
policy through legislative action, and this is indeed what section
113 attempts. The statutory thrust is to abolish restraints on
future employment which the legislature found to be undesirable.
Yet when the legislature confronted the problem, it determined
that some kinds of restrictions on future employment are legiti-
mate and necessary.
Once it is acknowledged that a distinction between good and
bad restraints had to be made, the legislature was poorly
equipped to cope with the problem. All it could do was state in
statutory terms the criteria which the common law rule should
contain. Thus, the legislation declares restraints on future em-
ployment to be void with certain exceptions, and those exceptions
turn out to be strikingly similar to the standards for "reasonable-
ness" which the Colorado courts have already articulated. 7 The
courts are still left to define the terms and their application in
particular cases. If one concludes that the Colorado courts have
demonstrated a tendency to define and apply the rules in a way
which is in effect biased in favor of enforcement, the impact of
section 113 is likely to be modest. Moreover, to the extent that
section 113 provides an impregnable barrier which clearly pro-
tects some covenantors, the courts may sometimes be prevented
from granting relief which equity would otherwise require.
The effect of section 113, however limited, should not be
deprecated. There are certainly a significant number of cases in
17S See text accompanying notes 48-54 supra for a discussion of the particular factors
used by Colorado courts to justify enforcement of noncompetition covenants including:
customer contacts, trade secrets, training, technical or complex business, degree of compe-
tition, key employee status, and uniqueness of services rendered.
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which the covenantor will clearly fall within its protection. "' To
this extent section 113 should have a generally wholesome effect.
Its most obvious advantage is that in some cases it will eliminate
any question as to the invalidity of a covenant without the necess-
ity of expensive litigation and thereby do away with the dampen-
ing effect that such covenants have on the covenantor's activities.
It is by no means clear that noncompetition covenants are
ever defensible, at least within the context of present and future
employment of the covenantor. Other common law and statutory
remedies, such as those related to trade secret protection, could
provide adequate, although less definite and convenient, protec-
tion to the covenantee. However, within the context of the exist-
ing Colorado rules, it appears that there is room for significant
improvement in the way in which such rules are applied by the
courts, and perhaps section 113 will provide some impetus for the
courts to reevaluate their attitudes in the restrictive covenant
area.
I"' See note 177 supra for a discussion of the probable effect that section 113 would
have had on cases previously decided under Colorado law.
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